Related papers: Games with incomplete information in continuous ti…

We study minimax (generalized) solutions of a Cauchy problem for a (first-order) path-dependent Hamilton--Jacobi equation with co-invariant derivatives under a right-end boundary condition. Under assumptions on the Hamiltonian that are more…

We prove that in a general zero-sum repeated game where the first player is more informed than the second player and controls the evolution of information on the state, the uniform value exists. This result extends previous results on…

Value methods for solving stochastic games with partial observability model the uncertainty about states of the game as a probability distribution over possible states. The dimension of this belief space is the number of states. For many…

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…

In stochastic games with stage duration h, players act at times 0, h, 2h, and so on. The payoff and leaving probabilities are proportional to h. As h approaches 0, such discrete-time games approximate games played in continuous time. The…

We discuss a class of time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi equations, where an unknown function of time is intended to keep the maximum of the solution to the constant value 0. Our main result is that the full problem has a unique viscosity…

In this paper, we consider a differential stochastic zero-sum game in which two players intervene by adopting impulse controls in a finite time horizon. We provide a numerical solution as an approximation of the value function, which turns…

We consider an initial value problem for a Hamilton--Jacobi equation with a quadratic and degenerate Hamiltonian. Our Hamiltonian comes from the dynamics of $N$-peakon in the Camassa--Holm equation. It is given by a quadratic form with a…

We study a class of zero-sum stochastic games between a stopper and a singular-controller, previously considered in [Bovo and De Angelis (2025)]. The underlying singularly-controlled dynamics takes values in…

Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…

We consider 2-players, 2-values minimization games where the players' costs take on two values, $a,b$, $a<b$. The players play mixed strategies and their costs are evaluated by unimodal valuations. This broad class of valuations includes…

We consider the value function originating from an expected utility maximization problem with finite fuel constraint and show its close relation to a nonlinear parabolic degenerated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with singularity.…

We study two classes of zero-sum stochastic games with compact action sets and a finite product state space. These two classes assume a communication property on the state spaces of the players. For strongly communicating on one side games,…

Blackwell games are infinite games of imperfect information. The two players simultaneously make their moves, and are then informed of each other's moves. Payoff is determined by a Borel measurable function $f$ on the set of possible…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations…

We provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first computational study of extensive-form adversarial team games. These games are sequential, zero-sum games in which a team of players, sharing the same utility function, faces an adversary.…

We investigate the large-time behavior of the value functions of the optimal control problems on the $n$-dimensional torus which appear in the dynamic programming for the system whose states are governed by random changes. From the point of…

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…

In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is…