Related papers: Generalized selfish bin packing
In this paper we present the first algorithm with optimal average-case and close-to-best known worst-case performance for the classic on-line problem of bin packing. It has long been observed that known bin packing algorithms with optimal…
We study the Min-Weighted Sum Bin Packing problem, a variant of the classical Bin Packing problem in which items have a weight, and each item induces a cost equal to its weight multiplied by the index of the bin in which it is packed. This…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for computing $d^{d+o(d)}$-approximate (pure) Nash equilibria in (proportional sharing) weighted congestion games with polynomial cost functions of degree at most $d$. This is an…
This paper provides a comprehensive convergence analysis of the PoA of both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands.
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…
This paper establishes the Price of Stability (PoS) for First Price Auctions, for all equilibrium concepts that have been studied in the literature: Bayes Nash Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Correlated Equilibrium $\subsetneq$ Bayes Coarse…
There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the…
We analyze an infinite-horizon deterministic joint replenishment model from a non-cooperative game-theoretical approach. In this model, a group of retailers can choose to jointly place an order, which incurs a major setup cost independent…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…
We study the online bin packing problem under two stochastic settings. In the bin packing problem, we are given n items with sizes in (0,1] and the goal is to pack them into the minimum number of unit-sized bins. First, we study bin packing…
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We concentrate on…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we…
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…
This paper gives a complete analysis of worst-case equilibria for various versions of weighted congestion games with two players and affine cost functions. The results are exact price of anarchy bounds which are parametric in the weights of…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games to model resource allocation by different users. As computing an exact or even an approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete, Caragiannis et al. (2011) present a…