Related papers: Exact Algorithms for Solving Stochastic Games
Stochastic games with discounted payoff, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players try to optimize a discounted sum of rewards. In this model, long-term weights are geometrically…
Traditional solvable game theory and mean-field-type game theory (risk-aware games) predominantly focus on quadratic costs due to their analytical tractability. Nevertheless, they often fail to capture critical non-linearities inherent in…
We consider a zero-sum stochastic game for continuous-time Markov chain with countable state space and unbounded transition and pay-off rates. The additional feature of the game is that the controllers together with taking actions are also…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
This paper is an attempt to compute the value and saddle points of zero-sum risk-sensitive average stochastic games. For the average games with finite states and actions, we first introduce the so-called irreducibility coefficient and then…
Poset games are a class of combinatorial game that remain unsolved. Soltys and Wilson proved that computing wining strategies is in \textbf{PSPACE} and aside from special cases such as Nim and N-Free games, \textbf{P} time algorithms for…
Two-player graph games have found numerous applications, most notably in the synthesis of reactive systems from temporal specifications, but also in verification. The relevance of infinite-state systems in these areas has lead to…
The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can be approximated to within $\epsilon$ in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times polynomial in logarithmic in…
Parity games are simple infinite games played on finite graphs with a winning condition that is expressive enough to capture nested least and greatest fixpoints. Through their tight relationship to the modal mu-calculus, they are used in…
We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…
We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game we prove the existence of value and…
One-clock priced timed games is a class of two-player, zero-sum, continuous-time games that was defined and thoroughly studied in previous works. We show that one-clock priced timed games can be solved in time m 12^n n^(O(1)), where n is…
We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…
Priced timed games are two-player zero-sum games played on priced timed automata (whose locations and transitions are labeled by weights modeling the costs of spending time in a state and executing an action, respectively). The goals of the…
In 1953, Lloyd Shapley defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general dynamic model of a game to be defined, and proved that competitive stochastic games have a discounted value. In 1982, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois Mertens and…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…