Related papers: Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternati…
By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
When each voter rates or ranks several candidates for a single office, a strong Condorcet winner (SCW) is one who beats all others in two-way races. Among 21 electoral systems examined, 18 will sometimes make candidate X the winner even if…
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters…
In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their…
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base…
Limited Voting (LV) is an approval-based method for multi-winner elections where all ballots are required to have a same fixed size. While it appears to be used as voting method in corporate governance and has some political applications,…
We consider a distributed voting problem with a set of agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space. The goal is to compute the…
We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging blockchain governance systems, which include voters with…
This paper investigates the voting behaviors of Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4 and LLaMA-2, their biases, and how they align with human voting patterns. Our methodology involved using a dataset from a human voting…
Are there voting methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective power even if voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status…
Majority voting is considered an effective method to enhance chain-of-thought reasoning, as it selects the answer with the highest "self-consistency" among different reasoning paths (Wang et al., 2023). However, previous chain-of-thought…
Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a weakness of liquid democracy is that a small subset of…
Iterative voting is a natural model of repeated strategic decision-making in social choice theory when agents have the opportunity to update their votes prior to finalizing the group decision. Prior work has analyzed the efficacy of…
We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a…
This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and…
We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their beliefs rationally? We investigate whether it is…