Related papers: A Logic for Strategy Updates
It is common to make a distinction between "strategic" behavior and other forms of intentional but "nonstrategic" behavior: typically, that strategic agents model other agents while nonstrategic agents do not. However, a crisp boundary…
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of such situations.…
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is a logical framework in which one can describe in great detail how actions are perceived by the agents, and how they affect the world. DEL games were recently introduced as a way to define classes of games…
Rationality has been an intriguing topic for several decades. Even the scope of definition of rationality across different subjects varies. Several theories (e.g., game theory) initially evolved on the basis that agents (e.g., humans) are…
Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
In a distributed game we imagine a team Player engaging a team Opponent in a distributed fashion. Such games and their strategies have been formalised in concurrent games based on event structures. However there are limitations in founding…
We define reachability games based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), where the players' actions are finely described as DEL action models. We first consider the setting where an external controller with perfect information interacts with an…
We consider games played on finite graphs, whose goal is to obtain a trace belonging to a given set of winning traces. We focus on those states from which Player 1 cannot force a win. We explore and compare several criteria for establishing…
This article presents an overview of computability logic -- the game-semantically constructed logic of interactive computational tasks and resources. There is only one non-overview, technical section in it, devoted to a proof of the…
An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make a conscious choice between which of these statements will be true. This paper proposes to capture ethical dilemmas as a…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
Game theory's prescriptive power typically relies on full rationality and/or self-play interactions. In contrast, this work sets aside these fundamental premises and focuses instead on heterogeneous autonomous interactions between two or…
Game theory provides a framework for studying communication dynamics and emergent phenomena arising from rational agent interactions. We present a model framework for the Volunteer's Dilemma with four key contributions: (1) formulating it…
Perfect synchronicity in $N$-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets are asynchronous by design, and yet most…
A systematic framework for analyzing dynamical attributes of games has not been well-studied except for the special class of potential or near-potential games. In particular, the existing results have shortcomings in determining the…
Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even…
We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of "possible profiles" that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile.…
Synthesis of bulletproof strategies in imperfect information scenarios is a notoriously hard problem. In this paper, we suggest that it is sometimes a viable alternative to aim at "reasonably good" strategies instead. This makes sense not…