Related papers: Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated ma…
We consider team zero-sum network congestion games with $n$ agents playing against $k$ interceptors over a graph $G$. The agents aim to minimize their collective cost of sending traffic over paths in $G$, which is an aggregation of edge…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
Coordinated missions involving Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in dynamic environments pose significant challenges in maintaining both coordination and agility. In this paper, relying on the cooperative path following framework and using a…
We consider the problem of scheduling $n$ precedence-constrained jobs on $m$ uniformly-related machines in the presence of an arbitrary, fixed communication delay $\rho$. We consider a model that allows job duplication, i.e. processing of…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…
We study the problem of scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, where the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism, which…
How can we design mechanisms to promote efficient use of shared resources? Here, we answer this question in relation to the well-studied class of atomic congestion games, used to model a variety of problems, including traffic routing.…
This paper considers scheduling on identical machines. The scheduling objective considered in this paper generalizes most scheduling minimization problems. In the problem, there are $n$ jobs and each job $j$ is associated with a…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
The design of distributed algorithms is central to the study of multiagent systems control. In this paper, we consider a class of combinatorial cost-minimization problems and propose a framework for designing distributed algorithms with a…
Machine scheduling problems involving conflict jobs can be seen as a constrained version of the classical scheduling problem, in which some jobs are conflict in the sense that they cannot be proceeded simultaneously on different machines.…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
In malleable job scheduling, jobs can be executed simultaneously on multiple machines with the processing time depending on the number of allocated machines. In this setting, jobs are required to be executed non-preemptively and in unison,…
When a computer system schedules jobs there is typically a significant cost associated with preempting a job during execution. This cost can be from the expensive task of saving the memory's state and loading data into and out of memory. It…
We provide a dual fitting technique on a semidefinite program yielding simple proofs of tight bounds for the robust price of anarchy of several congestion and scheduling games under the sum of weighted completion times objective. The same…
We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…