Related papers: Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated ma…
We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…
In various online/offline multi-agent networked environments, it is very popular that the system can benefit from coordinating actions of two interacting agents at some cost of coordination. In this paper, we first formulate an optimization…
The problem of scheduling non-simultaneously released jobs with due dates on a single machine with the objective to minimize the maximum job lateness is known to be strongly NP-hard. Here we consider an extended model in which the…
We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES)…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Inspired by the path coordination problem arising from robo-taxis, warehouse management, and mixed-vehicle routing problems, we model a group of heterogeneous players responding to stochastic demands as a congestion game under Markov…
We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as…
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent…
This paper provides three nearly-optimal algorithms for scheduling $t$ jobs in the $\mathsf{CLIQUE}$ model. First, we present a deterministic scheduling algorithm that runs in $O(\mathsf{GlobalCongestion} + \mathsf{dilation})$ rounds for…
We introduce a natural but seemingly yet unstudied generalization of the problem of scheduling jobs on a single machine so as to minimize the number of tardy jobs. Our generalization lies in simultaneously considering several instances of…
Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…
A new class of multi agent single machine scheduling problems is introduced, where each job is associated with a self interested agent with a utility function decreasing in completion time. We aim to achieve a fair solution by maximizing…
This paper investigates equilibrium computation and the price of anarchy for Bayesian games, which are the fundamental models of games with incomplete information. In normal-form games with complete information, it is known that efficiently…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
We address two major challenges of implicit coordination in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning: non-stationarity and exponential growth of state-action space, by combining Deep-Q Networks for policy learning with Nash equilibrium for…
We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…
In this paper, we study the classic optimization problem of Related Machine Online Load Balancing under the conditions of selfish machines and selfish jobs. We have $m$ related machines with varying speeds and $n$ jobs arriving online with…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…