Related papers: An adjusted payoff-based procedure for normal form…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
Many autonomous agents, such as intelligent vehicles, are inherently required to interact with one another. Game theory provides a natural mathematical tool for robot motion planning in such interactive settings. However, tractable…
We define the class of "simple recursive games". A simple recursive game is defined as a simple stochastic game (a notion due to Anne Condon), except that we allow arbitrary real payoffs but disallow moves of chance. We study the complexity…
This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility, finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of…
In this paper, we introduce a natural learning rule for mean field games with finite state and action space, the so-called myopic adjustment process. The main motivation for these considerations are the complex computations necessary to…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for…
Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions. Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow for tractable…
This paper considers information sharing in a multi-player repeated game. Every round, each player observes a subset of components of a random vector and then takes a control action. The utility earned by each player depends on the full…
A network model of manufacturing system is considered. This is a network formation game where players are participants of a production process and their actions are their's requests for interaction. Production networks are formed as a…
We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…
We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We…
A Dynkin game is a zero-sum, stochastic stopping game between two players where either player can stop the game at any time for an observable payoff. Typically the payoff process of the max-player is assumed to be smaller than the payoff…
In several standard models of dynamic programming (gambling houses, MDPs, POMDPs), we prove the existence of a very robust notion of value for the infinitely repeated problem, namely the pathwise uniform value. This solves two open…
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
We introduce novel multi-agent interaction models of entropic spatially inhomogeneous evolutionary undisclosed games and their quasi-static limits. These evolutions vastly generalize first and second order dynamics. Besides the…