Related papers: Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in…
In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a…
Typically, fair machine learning research focuses on a single decisionmaker and assumes that the underlying population is stationary. However, many of the critical domains motivating this work are characterized by competitive marketplaces…
In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
In this work, we analyze the influence of a single strategic agent on the quality of the other agents' matchings in a matching market. We consider a stable matching problem with $n$ men and $n$ women when preferences are drawn uniformly…
Mutualistic interactions, which are beneficial for both interacting species, are recurrently present in ecosystems. Observations of natural systems showed that, if we draw mutualistic relationships as binary links between species, the…
An approximation of strategyproofness in large, two-sided matching markets is highly evident. Through simulations, one can observe that the percentage of agents with useful deviations decreases as the market size grows. Furthermore, there…
Most models of social contagion take peer exposure to be a corollary of adoption, yet in many settings, the visibility of one's adoption behavior happens through a separate decision process. In online systems, product designers can define…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
The Stable Roommates problems are characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates. A solution is a partition of the agents into pairs that are acceptable to each other (i.e., they are in the preference lists of…
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect their material…
We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…