Related papers: On minimum sum representations for weighted voting…
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…
In this paper, some new criteria for detecting whether a finite game is potential are proposed by solving potential equations. The verification equations with the minimal number for checking a potential game are obtained for the first time.…
Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…
In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate $n$ votes i.i.d. according to a…
Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is…
The space of finite games can be decomposed into three orthogonal subspaces [5], which are the subspaces of pure potential games, nonstrategic games and pure harmonic games. The orthogonal projections onto these subspaces are represented as…
We define an all-small ruleset, Bipass, within the framework of normal-play combinatorial games. A game is played on finite strips of black and white stones. Stones of different colors are swapped provided they do not bypass one of their…
We show how two techniques from statistical physics can be adapted to solve a variant of the notorious Unique Games problem, potentially opening new avenues towards the Unique Games Conjecture. The variant, which we call Count Unique Games,…
Based on Holler (1982) and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021) we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in the class of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare these new power indices with their…
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we…
A vanishing sum of roots of unity is called minimal if no proper, nonempty sub-sum of it vanishes. This paper classifies all minimal vanishing sums of roots of unity of weight at most 16 by hand, thereby uncovering new phenomena beyond the…
Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A players power…
We introduce quantitative reductions, a novel technique for structuring the space of quantitative games and solving them that does not rely on a reduction to qualitative games. We show that such reductions exhibit the same desirable…
In a previous article Don Bennett and I looked for, found and proposed a game in which the Standard Model Gauge Group $S(U(2) \times U(3))$ gets singled out as the "winner". This "game" means that the by Nature chosen gauge group should be…
We propose and study an evolutionary minority game (EMG) in which the agents are allowed to choose among three possible options. Unlike the original EMG where the agents either win or lose one unit of wealth, the present model assigns one…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
Each voter $i \in I$ has $\alpha_i$ cards that (s)he distributes among the candidates $a \in A$ as a measure of approval. One (or several) candidate(s) who received the maximum number of cards is (are) elected. We provide polynomial…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case…
Parsimonious games are a subset of constant sum homogeneous weighted majority games unequivocally described by their free type representation vector. We show that the minimal winning quota of parsimonious games satisfies a second order,…