Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices
Computer Science and Game Theory
2024-02-12 v1 Optimization and Control
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we define and characterize a new power index for the family of weighted majority games that combines ideas of the Public Good (Holler in Polit Stud 30(2):262-271, 1982) and Colomer-Mart\'inez power indices. Finally, we analyze the National Assembly of Ecuador using these and some other well-known power indices.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2402.06298,
title = {Mergeable weighted majority games and characterizations of some power indices},
author = {Livino M. Armijos-Toro and José M. Alonso-Meijide and Manuel A. Mosquera},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06298},
year = {2024}
}
Comments
This article was published on April 15, 2023 in Open Access in the journal Annals of Operations Research