Related papers: On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Pri…
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in…
This paper studies privacy and secure function evaluation in communication complexity. The focus is on quantum versions of the model and on protocols with only approximate privacy against honest players. We show that the privacy loss (the…
We consider a scenario in which a database stores sensitive data of users and an analyst wants to estimate statistics of the data. The users may suffer a cost when their data are used in which case they should be compensated. The analyst…
In auction theory, cryptography has been used to achieve anonymity of the participants, security and privacy of the bids, secure computation and to simulate mediator (auctioneer). Auction theory focuses on revenue and Cryptography focuses…
In recent years, differential privacy has emerged as the de facto standard for sharing statistics of datasets while limiting the disclosure of private information about the involved individuals. This is achieved by randomly perturbing the…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
Truthful spectrum auction is believed to be an effective method for spectrum redistribution. However, privacy concerns have largely hampered the practical applications of truthful spectrum auctions. In this paper, to make the applications…
Consider a pair of random variables $(X,Y)$ distributed according to a given joint distribution $p_{XY}$. A curator wishes to maximally disclose information about $Y$, while limiting the information leakage incurred on $X$. Adopting mutual…
We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes…
The design of a statistical signal processing privacy problem is studied where the private data is assumed to be observable. In this work, an agent observes useful data $Y$, which is correlated with private data $X$, and wants to disclose…
We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the buyer and the seller. Specifically, we ask whether using…
We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For…
We present a new approach to machine learning-powered combinatorial auctions, which is based on the principles of Differential Privacy. Our methodology guarantees that the auction mechanism is truthful, meaning that rational bidders have…
Spectrum auction is an effective approach to improving spectrum utilization, by leasing idle spectrum from primary users to secondary users. Recently, a few differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, but, as far…
A family of existing protocols for quantum sealed-bid auction is critically analyzed, and it is shown that they are vulnerable under several attacks (e.g., the participant's and non-participant's attacks as well as the collusion attack of…
Consider two data providers that want to contribute data to a certain learning model. Recent works have shown that the value of the data of one of the providers is dependent on the similarity with the data owned by the other provider. It…
Single-shot auctions are commonly used as a means to sell goods, for example when selling ad space or allocating radio frequencies, however devising mechanisms for auctions with multiple bidders and multiple items can be complicated. It has…
We derive a closed-form bid-ask spread and welfare decomposition for the Glosten-Milgrom 1985 sequential-trading model when the market maker observes the trade direction perturbed by a binary flip channel of probability $\eta$ -- a natural…