Related papers: On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Pri…
We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, it extracts at least $\frac{1}{2.62}$-fraction of revenue;…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving good…
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security…
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payment may or may not happen, and its probability is called the…
While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating…
We introduce a new information theoretic measure that we call Public Information Complexity (PIC), as a tool for the study of multi-party computation protocols, and of quantities such as their communication complexity, or the amount of…
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…
We introduce a restriction of the classical 2-party deterministic communication protocol where Alice and Bob are restricted to using only comparison functions. We show that the complexity of a function in the model is, up to a constant…
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity, volume, variety, and…
As an effective resource allocation approach, double auctions (DAs) have been extensively studied in electronic commerce. Most previous studies have focused on how to design strategy-proof DA mechanisms, while not much research effort has…
In this paper, we propose a protocol that preserves (statistical) privacy of agents' costs in peer-to-peer distributed optimization against a passive adversary that corrupts certain number of agents in the network. The proposed protocol…
We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable, which the bidder may want to conceal or partially reveal,…
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbitrarily more revenue could potentially be extracted than if…
The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data to…
We consider a two-user secure computation problem in which Alice and Bob communicate interactively in order to compute some deterministic functions of the inputs. The privacy requirement is that each user should not learn any additional…
The shuffle model of differential privacy was proposed as a viable model for performing distributed differentially private computations. Informally, the model consists of an untrusted analyzer that receives messages sent by participating…
Auctions are important mechanisms extensively implemented in various markets, e.g., search engines' keyword auctions, antique auctions, etc. Finding an optimal auction mechanism is extremely difficult due to the constraints of imperfect…
In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…