Related papers: Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaini…
This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…
We study a distributed allocation process where, repeatedly in time, every player renegotiates past allocations with neighbors and allocates new revenues. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging…
In this paper, we consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) coalitional games where the coalitional values are unknown but vary within certain bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalise the notion of "robust…
We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
We consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertainty in the coalitional values. We provide a novel methodology to study the stability of the grand coalition in the case where each coalition constructs ambiguity sets for the (possibly)…
In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
Potential game is an emerging notion and framework for studying N-player games, especially with heterogeneous players. In this paper, we build an analytical framework for dynamic potential games. We prove that a game is a dynamic potential…
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…
We present a partial operator-theoretic characterization of approachability principle and based on this characterization, we interpret a particular distributed payoff allocation algorithm to be a sequence of time-varying paracontractions.…
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a group of agents, while maintaining stability in the sense of the core constraints of a cooperative transferable utility game, or TU game.…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
This paper proposes a novel algorithm to approximate the core of transferable utility (TU) cooperative games via linear programming. Given the computational hardness of determining the full core, our approach provides a tractable…
Consider $N$ players and $K$ games taking place simultaneously. Each of these games is modeled as a Tug-of-War (ToW) game where increasing the action of one player decreases the reward for all other players. Each player participates in only…
Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings,…