Related papers: Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaini…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…
In this paper, we propose a bilateral peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading scheme under single-contract and multi-contract market setups, both as an assignment game, and a special class of coalitional games. {The proposed market formulation…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p -additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo, 2002) and contains the class…
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition.…
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
The evolution of fairness in dyadic relationships has been studied using ultimatum games. However, human fairness is not limited to two-person situations and universal egalitarianism among group members is widely observed. In this study, we…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There is a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with…
Collaboration is an integral part of human dialogue. Typical task-oriented dialogue games assign asymmetric roles to the participants, which limits their ability to elicit naturalistic role-taking in collaboration and its negotiation. We…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents on the…
We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to each player's stand-alone worth. Focusing on fixed-population consistency, we characterize the proportional division…
This paper deals with a standard stochastic game model with a continuum of states under the duel-type setup. It newly proposes a hybrid model of game theory and the fluctuation process, which could be applied for various practical decision…
A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…
Negotiation is a process where agents aim to work through disputes and maximize their surplus. As the use of deep reinforcement learning in bargaining games is unexplored, this paper evaluates its ability to exploit, adapt, and cooperate to…