Related papers: Complexity of coalition structure generation
We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
We study the problem of finding Stackelberg equilibria in games with a massive number of players. So far, the only known game instances in which the problem is solved in polynomial time are some particular congestion games. However, a…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
The problem of generating an optimal coalition structure for a given coalition game of rational agents is to find a partition that maximizes their social welfare and is known to be NP-hard. This paper proposes GCS-Q, a novel…
We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which…
We study the classical coalition structure generation (CSG) problem and compare the anytime behavior of three algorithmic paradigms: dynamic programming (DP), MILP branch-and-bound, and sparse relaxations based on greedy or $l_1$-type…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
Combinatorial optimization algorithms for graph problems are usually designed afresh for each new problem with careful attention by an expert to the problem structure. In this work, we develop a new framework to solve any combinatorial…
The most important factors which contribute to the efficiency of game-theoretical algorithms are time and game complexity. In this study, we have offered an elegant method to deal with high complexity of game theoretic multi-objective…
We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of $j$ given losing coalitions into a set of $j$ winning coalitions.…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic…
Partial methods play an important role in formal methods and beyond. Recently such methods were developed for parity games, where polynomial-time partial solvers decide the winners of a subset of nodes. We investigate here how effective…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
Inspired by scenarios where the strategic network design and defense or immunisation are of the central importance, Goyal et al. [3] defined a new Network Formation Game with Attack and Immunisation. The authors showed that despite the…