Related papers: Popular b-matchings
Large language models are often ranked according to their level of alignment with human preferences -- a model is better than other models if its outputs are more frequently preferred by humans. One of the popular ways to elicit human…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
Matching markets, where agents are assigned to one another based on preferences and capacity constraints, are pervasive in various domains. This paper introduces MATWA (https://matwa.optimalmatching.com), a web application offering a rich…
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
Fashion plays a pivotal role in society. Combining garments appropriately is essential for people to communicate their personality and style. Also different events require outfits to be thoroughly chosen to comply with underlying social…
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result generalizes the presented in Sotomayor (1996 and 2012) for the…
In the well-studied Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of agents into pairs, where no two agents prefer each other over their assigned partners. However, some instances of this problem are unsolvable, lacking any stable…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
Matching games is a novel matching model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game they play simultaneously with the matching process. Matching games…
Let A and B be two finite sets of points with total cardinality n, the many to many point matching with demands and capacities matches each point ai in A to at least alpha'i and at most alphai points in B, and each point bj in B to at least…
In this paper B-Rank, an efficient ranking algorithm for recommender systems, is proposed. B-Rank is based on a random walk model on hypergraphs. Depending on the setup, B-Rank outperforms other state of the art algorithms in terms of…
Algorithmic-matching sites offer users access to an unprecedented number of potential mates. However, they also pose a principal-agent problem with a potential moral hazard. The agent's interest is to maximize usage of the Web site, while…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
We consider the problem of matching applicants to posts where applicants have preferences over posts. Thus the input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (A U P,E), where A denotes a set of applicants, P is a set of posts, and there are…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…