Related papers: Popular b-matchings
A central problem in multiagent systems is the fair assignment of objects to agents. In this paper, we initiate the analysis of classic majoritarian social choice functions in assignment. Exploiting the special structure of the assignment…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time…
We study the problem of an organization that matches agents to objects where agents have preference rankings over objects and the organization uses algorithms to construct a ranking over objects on behalf of each agent. Our new framework…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
The classic Stable Roommates problem (which is the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) asks whether there is a stable matching for a given set of agents, i.e. a partitioning of the agents into disjoint…
Rank aggregation is an essential approach for aggregating the preferences of multiple agents. One rule of particular interest is the Kemeny rule, which maximises the number of pairwise agreements between the final ranking and the existing…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Popularity bias is a well-known phenomenon in recommender systems: popular items are recommended even more frequently than their popularity would warrant, amplifying long-tail effects already present in many recommendation domains. Prior…
The issue of popularity bias -- where popular items are disproportionately recommended, overshadowing less popular but potentially relevant items -- remains a significant challenge in recommender systems. Recent advancements have seen the…
We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For…
We study fairness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives one house. We show that maximizing the number of envy-free agents is hard to approximate to within a factor of…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
Becker (1973) presents a bilateral matching model in which scalar types describe agents. For this framework, he establishes the conditions under which positive sorting between agents' attributes is the unique market outcome. Becker's…
Recently MV18 identified and initiated work on the new problem of understanding structural relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances of stable matching. They also gave an application of their work to finding…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
Complete axiomatizations and exponential-time decision procedures are provided for reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge when there are infinitely many agents. The results show that reasoning about knowledge and common knowledge…
There is growing research interest in recommendation as a multi-stakeholder problem, one where the interests of multiple parties should be taken into account. This category subsumes some existing well-established areas of recommendation…