Related papers: Popular b-matchings
Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model for coalition formation which is suitable for our usecase. We propose here two clearing-houses mechanisms that return sound matchings. The first aims at maximizing the global satisfaction of…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
We propose and investigate a model for mate searching and marriage in large societies based on a stochastic matching process and simple decision rules. Agents have preferences among themselves given by some probability distribution. They…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In the rank-maximal matching problem we are given a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup P, E)$ such that $A$ denotes a set of applicants and $P$ a set of posts. Each…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review…
In this paper, we study the problem of eliciting preferences of agents in the house allocation model. For this we build on a recent model of Hosseini et al.[AAAI'21] and focus on the task of eliciting preferences to find matchings which are…
Recently there has been a growing interest in fairness-aware recommender systems including fairness in providing consistent performance across different users or groups of users. A recommender system could be considered unfair if the…
In order to represent the preferences of a group of individuals, we introduce Probabilistic CP-nets (PCP-nets). PCP-nets provide a compact language for representing probability distributions over preference orderings. We argue that they are…
Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper addresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The first…
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwise. It can be applied to many real-world scenarios and explain many social phenomena. In this article, we study the effect of competition on…
Items popularity is a strong signal in recommendation algorithms. It strongly affects collaborative filtering approaches and it has been proven to be a very good baseline in terms of results accuracy. Even though we miss an actual…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the…