General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
Theoretical Economics
2022-10-14 v1
Abstract
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result generalizes the presented in Sotomayor (1996 and 2012) for the many-to-one model. In addition, we show General Manipulability Theorem fail when agents' preferences satisfy only substitutability.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2210.06549,
title = {General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model},
author = {Paola B. Manasero and Jorge Oviedo},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.06549},
year = {2022}
}