Related papers: Multivariate Analyis of Swap Bribery
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
In many online advertisement (ad) exchanges, ad slots are each sold via a separate second-price auction. This paper considers the bidder's problem of maximizing the value of ads they purchase in these auctions, subject to budget…
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…
Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein [AAMAS 2017] initiated the algorithmic study of a…
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that…
We study a model in which before a conflict between two parties escalates into a war (in the form of an all-pay auction), a party can offer a take-it-or-leave-it bribe to the other for a peaceful settlement. In contrast to the received…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches…
We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…
Rating systems play a vital role in the exponential growth of service-oriented markets. As highly rated online services usually receive substantial revenue in the markets, malicious sellers seek to boost their service evaluation by…
Recoverable robust optimization is a multi-stage approach, where it is possible to adjust a first-stage solution after the uncertain cost scenario is revealed. We analyze this approach for a class of selection problems. The aim is to choose…
The rise of algorithmic decision making led to active researches on how to define and guarantee fairness, mostly focusing on one-shot decision making. In several important applications such as hiring, however, decisions are made in multiple…
We study low sample complexity mechanisms in participatory budgeting (PB), where each voter votes for a preferred allocation of funds to various projects, subject to project costs and total spending constraints. We analyze the distortion…
This paper depicts algorithms for solving the decision Boolean Satisfiability Problem. An extreme problem is formulated to analyze the complexity of algorithms and the complexity for solving it. A novel and easy reformulation as a lottery…
We consider incentivized exploration: a version of multi-armed bandits where the choice of arms is controlled by self-interested agents, and the algorithm can only issue recommendations. The algorithm controls the flow of information, and…
The role of an expert in the decision-making process is crucial, as the final recommendation depends on his disposition, clarity of mind, experience, and knowledge of the problem. However, the recommendation also depends on their honesty.…
Multilevel programming is the standard framework for modeling hierarchical decision-making. In this paper, we characterize the computational complexity of deciding the existence of feasible and optimal solutions, as well as computing the…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
We study a model of temporal voting where there is a fixed time horizon, and at each round the voters report their preferences over the available candidates and a single candidate is selected. Prior work has adapted popular notions of…
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…
In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…