Related papers: Multivariate Analyis of Swap Bribery
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods…
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve…
In liquid democracy, each voter either votes herself or delegates her vote to some other voter. This gives rise to what is called a delegation graph. To decide the voters who eventually votes along with the subset of voters whose votes they…
The computational study of election problems generally focuses on questions related to the winner or set of winners of an election. But social preference functions such as Kemeny rule output a full ranking of the candidates (a consensus).…
Online advertising has motivated interest in online selection problems. Displaying ads to the right users benefits both the platform (e.g., via pay-per-click) and the advertisers (by increasing their reach). In practice, not all users click…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each voter supports the candidate that is closest under a distance induced by an…
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
A central question in computer science and statistics is whether efficient algorithms can achieve the information-theoretic limits of statistical problems. Many computational-statistical tradeoffs have been shown under average-case…
This work focuses on a specific classification problem, where the information about a sample is not readily available, but has to be acquired for a cost, and there is a per-sample budget. Inspired by real-world use-cases, we analyze average…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting…
We treat a version of the multiple-choice secretary problem called the multiple-choice duration problem, in which the objective is to maximize the time of possession of relatively best objects. It is shown that, for the $m$--choice duration…
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either adding or deleting candidates from the election (in the…
Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This…
We consider the fundamental problem of selecting $k$ out of $n$ random variables in a way that the expected highest or second-highest value is maximized. This question captures several applications where we have uncertainty about the…
We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…
Electing a single committee of a small size is a classical and well-understood voting situation. Being interested in a sequence of committees, we introduce and study two time-dependent multistage models based on simple Plurality voting.…