Related papers: Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap

We study the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function subject to a matroid independence constraint. For more than a decade, a rich body of work has studied this problem. Initially, a tight approximation of $ (1-\frac{1}{e})$ was…

Inference-time scaling methods rely on Process Reward Models (PRMs), which are often poorly calibrated and overestimate success probabilities. We propose, to our knowledge, the first use of conditional optimal transport for calibrating…

Most machine learning and deep neural network algorithms rely on certain iterative algorithms to optimise their utility/cost functions, e.g. Stochastic Gradient Descent. In distributed learning, the networked nodes have to work…

Two sellers compete to sell identical products to a single buyer. Each seller chooses an arbitrary mechanism, possibly involving lotteries, to sell their product. The utility-maximizing buyer can choose to participate in one or both…

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better…

We study multi-item profit maximization when there is an underlying distribution over buyers' values. In practice, a full description of the distribution is typically unavailable, so we study the setting where the mechanism designer only…

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches…

The Polytope Scheduling Problem (PSP) was introduced by Im, Kulkarni, and Munagala (JACM 2018) as a very general abstraction of resource allocation over time and captures many well-studied problems including classical unrelated machine…

We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an…

We study the online submodular maximization problem with free disposal under a matroid constraint. Elements from some ground set arrive one by one in rounds, and the algorithm maintains a feasible set that is independent in the underlying…

We study the problem of scheduling sensors in a resource-constrained linear dynamical system, where the objective is to select a small subset of sensors from a large network to perform the state estimation task. We formulate this problem as…

This article addresses the problem of efficient Bayesian inference in dynamic systems using particle methods and makes a number of contributions. First, we develop a correlated pseudo-marginal (CPM) approach for Bayesian inference in state…

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be…

We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which corresponds to the…

In a sponsored search auction the advertisement slots on a search result page are generally ordered by click-through rate. Bidders have a valuation, which is usually assumed to be linear in the click-through rate, a budget constraint, and…

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…

We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative (possibly non-monotone) submodular set function with or without constraints. Feige et al. [FOCS'07] showed a 2/5-approximation for the unconstrained problem and also proved that no…

We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…

We study policies aiming to minimize the weighted sum of completion times of jobs in the context of coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling problems. Our goal is to design local policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the…