Related papers: Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap
A diffusion auction refers to a selling process conducted over a social network, where each participant submits a bid and may invite other potential buyers to join the auction. Although various mechanisms have been proposed, none of them…
We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D. We show that if D is a distribution over…
Fast algorithms for submodular maximization problems have a vast potential use in applicative settings, such as machine learning, social networks, and economics. Though fast algorithms were known for some special cases, only recently…
Distributed maximization of a submodular function in the MapReduce (MR) model has received much attention, culminating in two frameworks that allow a centralized algorithm to be run in the MR setting without loss of approximation, as long…
This paper considers the problem of minimizing an expectation function over a closed convex set, coupled with a {\color{black} functional or expectation} constraint on either decision variables or problem parameters. We first present a new…
We present an optimal, combinatorial 1-1/e approximation algorithm for monotone submodular optimization over a matroid constraint. Compared to the continuous greedy algorithm (Calinescu, Chekuri, Pal and Vondrak, 2008), our algorithm is…
We consider dynamic auctions for finding Walrasian equilibria in markets with indivisible items and strong gross substitutes valuation functions. Each price adjustment step in these auction algorithms requires finding an inclusion-wise…
We consider a retailer selling a single product with limited on-hand inventory over a finite selling season. Customer demand arrives according to a Poisson process, the rate of which is influenced by a single action taken by the retailer…
Many algorithms that are originally designed without explicitly considering incentive properties are later combined with simple pricing rules and used as mechanisms. The resulting mechanisms are often natural and simple to understand. But…
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…
We consider the classic problem of scheduling jobs with precedence constraints on identical machines to minimize makespan, in the presence of communication delays. In this setting, denoted by $\mathsf{P} \mid \mathsf{prec}, c \mid…
For constrained, not necessarily monotone submodular maximization, all known approximation algorithms with ratio greater than $1/e$ require continuous ideas, such as queries to the multilinear extension of a submodular function and its…
Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the worst-case analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science. For…
We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items. Providing a simple mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal in this setting is a major open problem in mechanism…
Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social welfare undominated mechanisms in the…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
Selling a perfectly divisible item to potential buyers is a fundamental task with apparent applications to pricing communication bandwidth and cloud computing services. Surprisingly, despite the rich literature on single-item auctions,…
We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…