Related papers: Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap
Constrained submodular maximization has been extensively studied in the recent years. In this paper, we study adaptive robust optimization with nearly submodular structure (ARONSS). Our objective is to randomly select a subset of items that…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
Prophet inequalities and secretary problems have been extensively studied in recent years due to their elegance, connections to online algorithms, stochastic optimization, and mechanism design problems in game theoretic settings. Rubinstein…
The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a model for competition in markets where each firm offers a schedule of prices and quantities to face demand uncertainty, and has been successfully applied to wholesale electricity markets. However,…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and any (nonlinear) mixture of first and second price auction,…
This paper analyzes general spatially-coupled (SC) systems with multi-dimensional coupling. A continuum approximation is used to derive potential functions that characterize the performance of the SC systems. For any dimension of coupling,…
We study the facility location mechanism design problem where $n$ agents report their locations in Euclidean space, and the output is a single facility location. The cost function of each agent is the distance from the returned facility,…
Factorizing low-rank matrices is a problem with many applications in machine learning and statistics, ranging from sparse PCA to community detection and sub-matrix localization. For probabilistic models in the Bayes optimal setting, general…
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stability in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend to…
Optimization of sensor selection has been studied to monitor complex and large-scale systems with data-driven linear reduced-order modeling. An algorithm for greedy sensor selection is presented under the assumption of correlated noise in…
LLM agents in markets present algorithmic collusion risks. While prior work shows LLM agents reach supracompetitive prices through tacit coordination, existing research focuses on hand-crafted prompts. The emerging paradigm of prompt…
We present the analysis of a single-carrier massive MIMO system for the frequency selective Gaussian multi-user channel, in both uplink and downlink directions. We develop expressions for the achievable sum rate when there is spatial…
Interdependent values make basic auction design tasks -- in particular maximizing welfare truthfully in single-item auctions -- quite challenging. Eden et al. recently established that if the bidders valuation functions are submodular over…
In this paper, we show that SVRG and SARAH can be modified to be fundamentally faster than all of the other standard algorithms that minimize the sum of $n$ smooth functions, such as SAGA, SAG, SDCA, and SDCA without duality. Most finite…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…
Considering that a trader or a trading algorithm interacting with markets during continuous auctions can be modeled by an iterating procedure adjusting the price at which he posts orders at a given rhythm, this paper proposes a procedure…