Related papers: Unbeatable Imitation

The 2-spin Ising model in statistical mechanics and the 2x2 normal form game in game theory are compared. All configurations allowed by the second are recovered by the first when the only concern is about Nash equilibria. But it holds no…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

We introduce two-level discounted games played by two players on a perfect-information stochastic game graph. The upper level game is a discounted game and the lower level game is an undiscounted reachability game. Two-level games model…

In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which…

Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…

This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agents in a population game imitate the strategy of a randomly chosen opponent whenever the opponent`s realized payoff is…

We prove that, assuming the exponential time hypothesis, finding an \epsilon-approximately optimal symmetric signaling scheme in a two-player zero-sum game requires quasi-polynomial time. This is tight by [Cheng et al., FOCS'15] and…

We study two-player zero-sum games over infinite-state graphs with boundedness conditions. Our first contribution is about the strategy complexity, i.e the memory required for winning strategies: we prove that over general infinite-state…

We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…

Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…

In this paper, we propose a Quantum variation of combinatorial games, generalizing the Quantum Tic-Tac-Toe proposed by Allan Goff. A combinatorial game is a two-player game with no chance and no hidden information, such as Go or Chess. In…

We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…

The problem of two companies of agents with one-step memory playing game is investigated in the context of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under the partial imitation rule, where a player can imitate only those moves that he has observed in…

This paper concerns two-player alternating play combinatorial games (Conway 1976) in the normal-play convention, i.e. last move wins. Specifically, we study impartial vector subtraction games on tuples of nonnegative integers (Golomb 1966),…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

The uniform distribution is an important counterexample in game theory as many of the canonical game dynamics have been shown not to converge to the equilibrium in certain cases. In particular none of the canonical game dynamics converge to…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…