Related papers: Non-oblivious Strategy Improvement
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesizing reactive processes. In the synthesis of stochastic reactive processes, the traditional model is perfect-information stochastic games, where some transitions of the game graph…
We investigate an algorithm that assigns to any game in normal form an approximating game that admits an ordinal potential function. Due to the properties of potential games, the algorithm equips every game with a surrogate reward structure…
Many real-world multi-agent interactions consider multiple distinct criteria, i.e. the payoffs are multi-objective in nature. However, the same multi-objective payoff vector may lead to different utilities for each participant. Therefore,…
Classical objectives in two-player zero-sum games played on graphs often deal with limit behaviors of infinite plays: e.g., mean-payoff and total-payoff in the quantitative setting, or parity in the qualitative one (a canonical way to…
In the past few years, deep reinforcement learning has been proven to solve problems which have complex states like video games or board games. The next step of intelligent agents would be able to generalize between tasks, and using prior…
We consider the problem of high-level strategy selection in the adversarial setting of real-time strategy games from a reinforcement learning perspective, where taking an action corresponds to switching to the respective strategy. Here, a…
Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…
We study the statistical performance of a continual learning problem with two linear regression tasks in a well-specified random design setting. We consider a structural regularization algorithm that incorporates a generalized…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
Stochastic two-player games model systems with an environment that is both adversarial and stochastic. The adversarial part of the environment is modeled by a player (Player 2) who tries to prevent the system (Player 1) from achieving its…
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay…
We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
We identify a phenomenon, which we refer to as multi-model forgetting, that occurs when sequentially training multiple deep networks with partially-shared parameters; the performance of previously-trained models degrades as one optimizes a…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the exact structure of continuous-action games with non-parametric utility functions. We propose an $\ell_1$ regularized method which encourages sparsity of the coefficients of the Fourier…
We study deterministic games of infinite duration played on graphs and focus on the strategy complexity of quantitative objectives. Such games are known to admit optimal memoryless strategies over finite graphs, but require infinite-memory…
The performance of two pivoting algorithms, due to Lemke and Cottle and Dantzig, is studied on linear complementarity problems (LCPs) that arise from infinite games, such as parity, average-reward, and discounted games. The algorithms have…
In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the…
This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…