Related papers: Ising model versus normal form game

Learning or estimating game models from data typically entails inducing separate models for each setting, even if the games are parametrically related. In empirical mechanism design, for example, this approach requires learning a new game…

Strategic interactions often take place in an environment rife with uncertainty. As a result, the equilibrium of a game is intimately related to the information available to its players. The \emph{signaling problem} abstracts the task faced…

Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…

We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…

A bidimensional representation of the space of 2x2 Symmetric Games in the strategic representation is proposed. This representation provides a tool for the classification of 2x2 symmetric games, quantification of the fraction of them having…

We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…

Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…

Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…

We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian…

We present two zero-sum games modeling situations where one player attacks (or hides in) a finite dimensional nonempty compact set, and the other tries to prevent the attack (or find him). The first game, called patrolling game, corresponds…

Many combinatorial optimization problems can be reformulated as finding the ground state of the Ising model. Existing Ising solvers are mostly inspired by simulated annealing. Although annealing techniques offer scalability, they lack…

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide…

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…

We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…

This paper deals with the application of Approximation Theory type techniques to study a classical problem in Probability: estimating the parameter of a biased coin. For this purpose, a Minimax Estimation problem is considered and the…

Many economic interventions are designed as marginal changes in incentives. Yet in environments shaped by coordination, institutional persistence, and path dependence, such reforms often leave behavior largely unchanged. This paper studies…

At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…

The distributed computation of equilibria and optima has seen growing interest in a broad collection of networked problems. We consider the computation of equilibria of convex stochastic Nash games characterized by a possibly nonconvex…

We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…

Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…