Related papers: Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability
We consider a notion of rationalizability, where the rationalizing relation may depend on the set of feasible alternatives. More precisely, we say that a choice function is locally rationalizable if it is rationalized by a family of…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a…
The theory of optimal choice sets offers a well-established solution framework in social choice and game theory. In social choice theory, decision-making is typically modeled as a maximization problem. However, when preferences are cyclic…
Given the family $P$ of all nonempty subsets of a set $U$ of alternatives, a choice over $U$ is a function $c \colon \Omega \to P$ such that $\Omega \subseteq P$ and $c(B) \subseteq B$ for all menus $B \in \Omega$. A choice is total if…
I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the…
In the theory of social choice the research is focused around the projection of individual preference orders to the social preference order. Also, the justification of the preference order formalism begins with the concept of utility i.e.…
This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agenda manipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, so powerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding of Arrow's…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions, i.e., we offer a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
Nontransitive choices have long been an area of curiosity within economics. However, determining whether nontransitive choices represent an individual's preference is a difficult task since choice data is inherently stochastic. This paper…
We provide an axiomatic characterization of lexicographic preferences over the set of all random availability functions using two assumptions. The first assumption is strong monotonicity, which in our framework is equivalent to the strong…
A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's $\gamma$ axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be chosen from the union of the menus. Expansion consistency…
A broad range of on-line behaviors are mediated by interfaces in which people make choices among sets of options. A rich and growing line of work in the behavioral sciences indicate that human choices follow not only from the utility of…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…
A primary motivation for reasoning under uncertainty is to derive decisions in the face of inconclusive evidence. However, Shafer's theory of belief functions, which explicitly represents the underconstrained nature of many reasoning…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that appear in imprecise-probabilistic decision…