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We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In our trading network game, we show that a well-defined…
Reliable functioning of supply and transport networks fundamentally support many non-equilibrium dynamical systems, from biological organisms and ecosystems to human-made water, gas, heat, electricity and traffic networks. Strengthening an…
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel using game theory. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection.…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central…
The Braess's Paradox (BP) is the observation that adding one or more roads to the existing road network will counter-intuitively increase traffic congestion and slow down the overall traffic flow. Previously, the existence of the BP is…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
We consider the problem of designing the the utility functions of the utility-maximizing agents in a multi-agent system so that they work synergistically to maximize a global utility. The particular problem domain we explore is the control…
Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing technologies and autonomous driving, we revisit selfish…
Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents…
We consider a network composed of two interfering point-to-point links where the two transmitters can exploit one common relay node to improve their individual transmission rate. Communications are assumed to be multi-band and transmitters…
Motivated by the massive deployment of power-hungry data centers for service provisioning, we examine the problem of routing in optical networks with the aim of minimizing traffic-driven power consumption. To tackle this issue, routing must…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…
We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes…
Information-centric networking extensively uses universal in-network caching. However, developing an efficient and fair collaborative caching algorithm for selfish caches is still an open question. In addition, the communication overhead…
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…
We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows. In an effort to decouple the effect of risk-averse player…
We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…
The current framework of Internet interconnections, based on transit and settlement-free peering relations, has systemic problems that often cause peering disputes. We propose a new techno-economic interconnection framework called…