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In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…

The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…

This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…

Varied real world systems such as transportation networks, supply chains and energy grids present coordination problems where many agents must learn to share resources. It is well known that the independent and selfish interactions of…

The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. Motivated by this, this paper presents…

The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…

A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…

In the context of networking, research has focused on non-cooperative games, where the selfish agents cannot reach a binding agreement on the way they would share the infrastructure. Many approaches have been proposed for mitigating the…

The common sense suggests that networks are not random mazes of purposeless connections, but that these connections are organised so that networks can perform their functions well. One function common to many networks is targeted transport…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…

In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…

We consider a market in which capacity-constrained generators compete in scalar-parameterized supply functions to serve an inelastic demand spread throughout a transmission constrained power network. The market clears according to a…

We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…

The Braess paradox is a counter-intuitive phenomenon whereby adding roads to a network results in higher travel time at equilibrium. In this paper we present an algorithm to detect the occurrence of this paradox in real-world networks with…

Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…

This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…

We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…