Related papers: On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mecha…
We connect the power of Confidence Intervals in different Frequentist methods to their reliability. We show that in the case of a bounded parameter a biased method which near the boundary has large power in testing the parameter against…
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…
In this thesis we develop FPTASs for the counting problems of m-tuples, contingency tables with two rows, and 0/1 knapsack. For the problem of counting m-tuples, we design two algorithms, one is strongly polynomial. As far as we know, these…
Consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents with strict ordinal preferences over objects, where each agent is interested in consuming at most one object, and objects have integer minimum and maximum quotas. We define an…
In this work, we investigate online mechanisms for trading time-sensitive valued data. We adopt a continuous function $d(t)$ to represent the data value fluctuation over time $t$. Our objective is to design an \emph{online} mechanism…
Proper scoring rules elicit truth-telling when making predictions, or otherwise revealing information. However, when multiple predictions are made of the same event, telling the truth is in general no longer optimal, as agents are motivated…
Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the worst-case analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science. For…
Here several perfect simulation algorithms are brought under a single framework, and shown to derive from the same probabilistic result, called here the Fundamental Theorem of Perfect Simulation (FTPS). An exact simulation algorithm has…
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…
We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to…
We continue the systematic investigation of probabilistic and quantum finite automata (PFAs and QFAs) on promise problems by focusing on unary languages. We show that bounded-error QFAs are more powerful than PFAs. But, in contrary to the…
We consider a problem wherein jobs arrive at random times and assume random values. Upon each job arrival, the decision-maker must decide immediately whether or not to accept the job and gain the value on offer as a reward, with the…
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by…
We investigate {\em multidimensional covering mechanism-design} problems, wherein there are $m$ items that need to be covered and $n$ agents who provide covering objects, with each agent $i$ having a private cost for the covering objects he…
Usual quantum mechanics predicts probabilities for the outcomes of measurements carried out at definite moments of time. However, realistic measurements do not take place in an instant, but are extended over a period of time. The assumption…
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…
The best arm identification problem requires identifying the best alternative (i.e., arm) in active experimentation using the smallest number of experiments (i.e., arm pulls), which is crucial for cost-efficient and timely decision-making…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Opacity is a property of privacy and security applications asking whether, given a system model, a passive intruder that makes online observations of system's behaviour can ascertain some "secret" information of the system. Deciding opacity…
Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to $n$ symmetric bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that the second price auction with an appropriate reserve price is optimal when bidders'…