Related papers: On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mecha…
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of monetary transfers, Pareto efficient and truthful rules are…
We construct zero-error quantum finite automata (QFAs) for promise problems which cannot be solved by bounded-error probabilistic finite automata (PFAs). Here is a summary of our results: - There is a promise problem solvable by an exact…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the makespan was introduced in the seminal "Algorithmic Mechanism Design" paper by Nisan and Ronen. Nisan and Ronen showed that there is a truthful mechanism…
Approximate algorithms for structured prediction problems---such as LP relaxations and the popular alpha-expansion algorithm (Boykov et al. 2001)---typically far exceed their theoretical performance guarantees on real-world instances. These…
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a…
Wagering mechanisms are one-shot betting mechanisms that elicit agents' predictions of an event. For deterministic wagering mechanisms, an existing impossibility result has shown incompatibility of some desirable theoretical properties. In…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would…
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…
In the past decade, many parameterized algorithms were developed for packing problems. Our goal is to obtain tradeoffs that improve the running times of these algorithms at the cost of computing approximate solutions. Consider a packing…
We consider the power to reject false values of the parameter in Frequentist methods for the calculation of confidence intervals. We connect the power with the physical significance (reliability) of confidence intervals for a parameter…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…
We show that for several variations of partially observable Markov decision processes, polynomial-time algorithms for finding control policies are unlikely to or simply don't have guarantees of finding policies within a constant factor or a…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
Branch-and-bound algorithms (B&B) and polynomial-time approximation schemes (PTAS) are two seemingly distant areas of combinatorial optimization. We intend to (partially) bridge the gap between them while expanding the boundary of…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating indivisible, mixed-manna items. For basic measures of fairness, this problem is hard in general. Thus, research has flourished concerning input classes where efficient algorithms…
Motivated by a plethora of practical examples where bias is induced by automated-decision making algorithms, there has been strong recent interest in the design of fair algorithms. However, there is often a dichotomy between fairness and…
A quantum algorithm is exact if, on any input data, it outputs the correct answer with certainty (probability 1). A key question is: how big is the advantage of exact quantum algorithms over their classical counterparts: deterministic…