English

Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling

Computer Science and Game Theory 2020-11-17 v2

Abstract

The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the makespan was introduced in the seminal "Algorithmic Mechanism Design" paper by Nisan and Ronen. Nisan and Ronen showed that there is a truthful mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of min(m,n)\min(m,n), where nn is the number of machines and mm is the number of jobs. They also proved that no truthful mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 22. Since then, the lower bound was improved to 1+22.411 +\sqrt 2 \approx 2.41 by Christodoulou, Kotsoupias, and Vidali, and then to 1+ϕ2.6181+\phi\approx 2.618 by Kotsoupias and Vidali. Very recently, the lower bound was improved to 2.7552.755 by Giannakopoulos, Hammerl, and Pocas. In this paper we further improve the bound to 3δ3-\delta, for every constant δ>0\delta>0. Note that a gap between the upper bound and the lower bounds exists even when the number of machines and jobs is very small. In particular, the known 1+21+\sqrt{2} lower bound requires at least 33 machines and 55 jobs. In contrast, we show a lower bound of 2.20552.2055 that uses only 33 machines and 33 jobs and a lower bound of 1+21+\sqrt 2 that uses only 33 machines and 44 jobs. For the case of two machines and two jobs we show a lower bound of 22. Similar bounds for two machines and two jobs were known before but only via complex proofs that characterized all truthful mechanisms that provide a finite approximation ratio in this setting, whereas our new proof uses a simple and direct approach.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2007.04362,
  title  = {Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling},
  author = {Shahar Dobzinski and Ariel Shaulker},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.04362},
  year   = {2020}
}
R2 v1 2026-06-23T16:57:48.714Z