Related papers: Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coaliti…
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…
The Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index and other voting power indices measure the importance of a player in a coalitional game. We consider a simple coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game (SCG) based on an undirected,…
A new game-theoretic approach for combining multiple classifiers is proposed. A short introduction in Game Theory and coalitions illustrate the way any collective decision scheme can be viewed as a competitive game of coalitions that are…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class…
We study a basic sequential model for the discovery of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley-Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual…
In this paper, a novel approach for the optimal combination of binary classifiers is proposed. The classifier combination problem is approached from a Game Theory perspective. The proposed framework of adapted weighted majority rules (WMR)…
We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…
In this paper, we introduce a notion of mergeable weighted majority games with the aim of providing the first characterization of the Colomer-Mart\'inez power index (Colomer and Mart\'inez in J Theor Polit 7(1):41-63, 1995). Furthermore, we…
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting…
Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. A players power…
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games…
In this paper, we study two-player zero-sum turn-based games played on a finite multidimensional weighted graph. In recent papers all dimensions use the same measure, whereas here we allow to combine different measures. Such heterogeneous…
Weighted voting games apply to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a novel approach to the study of the power of big vs.~small…
Weighted voting games are a family of cooperative games, typically used to model voting situations where a number of agents (players) vote against or for a proposal. In such games, a proposal is accepted if an appropriately weighted sum of…
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
The Banzhaf power index was introduced in cooperative game theory to measure the real power of players in a game. The Banzhaf interaction index was then proposed to measure the interaction degree inside coalitions of players. It was shown…
We propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed number of basic games simultaneously. In each round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights, one for each basic…