Related papers: Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coaliti…
This paper addresses Monte Carlo algorithms for calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index in weighted majority games. First, we analyze a naive Monte Carlo algorithm and discuss the required number of samples. We then propose an efficient…
This paper contributes to the program of numerical characterisation and classification of simple games outlined in the classical monograph of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). One of the most fundamental questions of this program is what…
Oftentimes, the Shapley value becomes infeasible for games with many players. However, establishing symmetry allows for polynomial-time computation. To examine this reduction, we identify the spectrum of homogeneous group games by using an…
The Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) method is a ubiquitous meta-algorithm that works as follows: A distribution is maintained on a certain set, and at each step the probability assigned to element $\gamma$ is multiplied by $(1 -\epsilon…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
We show that, by using multiplicative weights in a game-theoretic thought experiment (and an important convexity result on the composition of multiplicative weights with the relative entropy function), a symmetric bimatrix game (that is, a…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…
In the original two-choice minority game (MG), selfish players cooperate with each other even though direct communication is not allowed. Moreover, there is a periodic dynamics in the MG whenever the strategy space size is much smaller than…
Weighted voting games are a popular class of coalitional games that are widely used to model real-life situations of decision-making. They can be applied, for instance, to analyze legislative processes in parliaments or voting in corporate…
False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting…
Learning and equilibrium computation in games are fundamental problems across computer science and economics, with applications ranging from politics to machine learning. Much of the work in this area revolves around a simple algorithm…
The formulation of Mean Field Games (MFG) typically requires continuous differentiability of the Hamiltonian in order to determine the advective term in the Kolmogorov--Fokker--Planck equation for the density of players. However, in many…
To demonstrate the usefulness of physical approaches for the study of realistic economic systems, we investigate the inequality of players' wealth in one of the most extensively studied econophysical models, namely, the minority game (MG).…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning in quantum games - and other classes of semidefinite games - with scalar, payoff-based feedback. For concreteness, we focus on the widely used matrix multiplicative weights (MMW) algorithm…
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…
We extend the weak-strong uniqueness principle for mean-field game (MFG) systems to a broad class of second-order stationary and time-dependent problems. Under standard monotonicity, growth, and coercivity assumptions on the Hamiltonian,…
This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of dummy voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions…
The classic paper of Shapley and Shubik \cite{Shapley1971assignment} characterized the core of the assignment game using ideas from matching theory and LP-duality theory and their highly non-trivial interplay. Whereas the core of this game…
Combinatorial Game Theory has also been called `additive game theory', whenever the analysis involves sums of independent game components. Such {\em disjunctive sums} invoke comparison between games, which allows abstract values to be…