Related papers: Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coaliti…
The Parallel Minority Game (PMG) refers to a set of Minority Games (MG), played in parallel, where each agent only has two choices to pick from, but each choice can host agents of many kind i.e., their other alternative can be from any…
Within the domain of game theory, power indexes are defined as functions that quantify the influence of individual participants in collective decision-making processes. Felsenthal [D. Felsenthal. A Well-Behaved Index of a Priori P-Power for…
Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like monotonicity and Condorcet consistency, which…
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework can handle resources with general…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
In this paper, we defined two new games - the mildly Menger game and the compact-clopen game. In a zero-dimensional space, the Menger game is equivalent to the mildly Menger game and the compact-open game is equivalent to the compact-clopen…
Assume that a treasure is placed in one of $M$ boxes according to a known distribution and that $k$ searchers are searching for it in parallel during $T$ rounds. We study the question of how to incentivize selfish players so that the…
Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…
Some standardized environments have been designed for partially observable multi-agent cooperation, but we find most current environments are synchronous, whereas real-world agents often have their own action spaces leading to asynchrony.…
This paper defines a general class of cooperative games for which the nucleolus is efficiently computable. This class includes new members for which the complexity of computing their nucleolus was not previously known. We show that when the…
The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
In this work, we define cooperative games on simplicial complexes, generalizing the study of probabilistic values of Weber and quasi-probabilistic values of Bilbao, Driessen, Jim\'{e}nez Losada and Lebr\'{o}n. Applications to Multi-Touch…
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solution concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computational…
The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This…
This paper introduces a notion of weak solution for the coupled system of master equations in mean field games with a major player. It extends the previously introduced notion of Lipschitz solutions in mean field games. By relying on a…
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea''…
We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
Schmidt games and the Cantor winning property give alternative notions of largeness, similar to the more standard notions of measure and category. Being intuitive, flexible, and applicable to recent research made them an active object of…