Related papers: Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel using game theory. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection.…

In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly benefits any player. Here we show that such an…

Decentralized data-feed systems enable blockchain-based smart contracts to access off-chain information by aggregating values from multiple oracles. To improve accuracy, these systems typically use an aggregation function, such as majority…

Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of…

Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze…

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy,…

Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…

We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the intractability of equilibrium computation in open-ended text…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

In this paper, we investigate the seeking of Nash equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative quadratic game where all agents exchange their delayed strategy information with their neighbors. To extend best-response algorithms to the delayed…

This paper studies a strategic model of marketing and product diffusion in social networks. We consider two firms offering substitutable products which can improve their market share by seeding the key individuals in the market. Consumers…

We explore the impact of mutual altruism among the players belonging to the same set -- their tribe -- in a partition of all players in arbitrary strategic games upon the quality of equilibria attained. To this end, we introduce the notion…

Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…

We consider seeking a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a monotone game, played by dynamic agents which are modeled as a class of lower-triangular nonlinear uncertain dynamics with external disturbances. We establish a general framework that…

This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

Two-vehicle racing is natural example of a competitive dynamic game. As with most dynamic games, there are many ways in which the underlying solution concept can be structured, resulting in different equilibrium concepts. The assumed…

We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…

Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling's famous…