Related papers: The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interacti…
Modern online platforms such as marketplaces, ride-hailing services, and food-delivery systems serve a dual role: they are both markets where participants interact and transact, and operators that design and govern how these markets…
Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information- and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while…
We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player --- who is associated with a subset of vertices --- matches as many of…
Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
Matching, capturing allocation of items to unit-demand buyers, or tasks to workers, or pairs of collaborators, is a central problem in economics. Indeed, the growing prevalence of matching-based markets, many of which online in nature, has…
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…
In complex systems, many different parts interact in non-obvious ways. Traditional research focuses on a few or a single aspect of the problem so as to analyze it with the tools available. To get a better insight of phenomena that emerge…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on…
We introduce two three sided adaptative systems as toy models to mimic the exchange of commodities between buyers and sellers. These models are simple extensions of the minority game, exhibiting similar behaviour as well as some new…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
We study the relation between the trading behavior of agents and volatility in toy markets of adaptive inductively rational agents. We show that excess volatility, in such simplified markets, arises as a consequence of {\em i)} the neglect…
A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a game theoretic…
Matching market models ignore prior commitments. Yet many job seekers, for example, are already employed, and the same holds for many other matching markets. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between…
We develop inference for a two-sided matching model where the characteristics of agents on one side of the market are endogenous due to pre-matching investments. The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets…
We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand but also to learn the attributes of new users in order to match them better in the future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous…
I study a two-sided marriage market in which agents have incomplete preferences -- i.e., they find some alternatives incomparable. The strong (weak) core consists of matchings wherein no coalition wants to form a new match between…