Related papers: Trembling hand perfection is NP-hard

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

We describe a new complete algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, based on a quadratically-constrained feasibility program formulation. We demonstrate that the algorithm runs significantly faster than the…

Is there an algorithm that takes a game in normal form as input, and outputs a Nash equilibrium? If the payoffs are integers, the answer is yes, and lot of work has been done in its computational complexity. If the payoffs are permitted to…

We study the evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria (NE) in a symmetric quantum game played by the recently proposed scheme of applying `identity' and `Pauli spin flip' operators on the initial state with classical probabilities. We show…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

We prove that computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a win-lose bimatrix game with constant sparsity is PPAD-hard for inverse-polynomial $\epsilon$. Our result holds for 3-sparse games, which is tight given that 2-sparse…

We consider the two-player game chomp on posets associated to numerical semigroups and show that the analysis of strategies for chomp is strongly related to classical properties of semigroups. We characterize, which player has a…

A version of the Monty Hall problem is presented where the players are permitted to select quantum strategies. If the initial state involves no entanglement the Nash equilibrium in the quantum game offers the players nothing more than can…

Poker is a large complex game of imperfect information, which has been singled out as a major AI challenge problem. Recently there has been a series of breakthroughs culminating in agents that have successfully defeated the strongest human…

In the Binary Networked Public Goods game, every player needs to decide if she participates in a public project whose utility is shared equally by the community. We study the problem of deciding if there exists a pure strategy Nash…

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as Matching Pennies, where their…

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…

We consider the computation of a Nash equilibrium in attack and defense games on networks (Bloch et al. [1]). We prove that a Nash Equilibrium of the game can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of nodes in the…

In this paper, I prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a large class of games with nonconvex strategy spaces. Specifically, if each player's strategies form a compact, connected Euclidean neighborhood retract and if…

We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements,…

Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…

We investigate the 3-player quantum Prisoner's Dilemma with a certain strategic space, a particular Nash equilibrium that can remove the original dilemma is found. Based on this equilibrium, we show that the game is enhanced by the…

We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…

We study natural strategic games on directed graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in the absence of globally common strategies. We show that these games do not need to have a pure Nash equilibrium and that the problem of…

Sequential equilibrium is one of the most fundamental refinements of Nash equilibrium for games in extensive form. However, it is not defined for extensive-form games in which a player can choose among a continuum of actions. We define a…