Related papers: Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist B…
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation---where $k$ manipulators try to manipulate an election on $m$ candidates---under general scoring rules, with a focus on the Borda protocol. We do so both in the weighted and unweighted…
We propose a fully data-driven, Koopman-based framework for statistically robust control of discrete-time nonlinear systems with linear embeddings. Establishing a connection between the Koopman operator and contraction theory, it offers…
We present a relation-algebraic model of Condorcet voting and, based on it, relation-algebraic solutions of the constructive control problem via the removal of voters. We consider two winning conditions, viz. to be a Condorcet winner and to…
Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
By the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more voters can change the election outcome in their favour by…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically instead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less preferred. The…
Language model outputs are not always reliable, thus prompting research into how to adapt model responses based on uncertainty. Common approaches include: \emph{abstention}, where models refrain from generating responses when uncertain; and…
Conformal prediction (CP) converts any model's output to prediction sets with a guarantee to cover the true label with (adjustable) high probability. Robust CP extends this guarantee to worst-case (adversarial) inputs. Existing baselines…
We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as…
Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…
The stability of a leadership against a growing internal opposition is studied in bottom-up hierarchical organizations. Using a very simple model with bottom-up majority rule voting, the dynamics of power distribution at the various…
Calculi with control operators have been studied to reason about control in programming languages and to interpret the computational content of classical proofs. To make these calculi into a real programming language, one should also…
Previous studies have shown that Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is highly resistant to coalitional manipulation (CM), though the theoretical reasons for this remain unclear. To address this gap, we analyze the susceptibility to CM of three…
The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. However, they often admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic…
We study the voting problem with two alternatives where voters' preferences depend on a not-directly-observable state variable. While equilibria in the one-round voting mechanisms lead to a good decision, they are usually hard to compute…
We study the problem of learning-augmented predictive linear quadratic control. Our goal is to design a controller that balances \textit{"consistency"}, which measures the competitive ratio when predictions are accurate, and…
Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important…