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It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…
We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…
In this paper, we consider batch supervised learning where an adversary is allowed to corrupt instances with arbitrarily large noise. The adversary is allowed to corrupt any $l$ features in each instance and the adversary can change their…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
The knockoff filter of Barber and Candes (arXiv:1404.5609) is a flexible framework for multiple testing in supervised learning models, based on introducing synthetic predictor variables to control the false discovery rate (FDR). Using the…
A new probabilistic technique for establishing the existence of certain regular combinatorial structures has been recentlyintroduced by Kuperberg, Lovett, and Peled (STOC 2012). Using this technique, it can be shown that under certain…
Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic…
Prevailing alignment methods target a fixed set of preferences and therefore risk forcing value lock-in as societal norms evolve over time. We introduce Adaptive Pluralistic Alignment (APA), a modular pipeline for updating pluralistically…
The standard voting methods in the United States, plurality and ranked choice (or instant runoff) voting, are susceptible to significant voting failures. These flaws include Condorcet and majority failures as well as monotonicity and…
Combinatorial auctions (CA) are a well-studied area in algorithmic mechanism design. However, contrary to the standard model, empirical studies suggest that a bidder's valuation often does not depend solely on the goods assigned to him. For…
In this paper, we propose a quadratic programming-based filter for safe and stable controller design, via a Control Barrier Function (CBF) and a Control Lyapunov Function (CLF). Our method guarantees safety and local asymptotic stability…
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but…
We present Bluebell, a program logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs where unary and relational styles of reasoning come together to create new reasoning tools. Unary-style reasoning is very expressive and is powered by…
End-to-end engineering design pipelines, in which designs are evaluated using concurrently defined optimal controllers, are becoming increasingly common in practice. To discover designs that perform well even under the misspecification of…
We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under Impartial Culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters that must be…
We study the design of voting rules in the metric distortion framework. It is known that any deterministic rule suffers distortion of at least $3$, and that randomized rules can achieve distortion strictly less than $3$, often at the cost…
Approval-based committee selection is a model of significant interest in social choice theory. In this model, we have a set of voters $\mathcal{V}$, a set of candidates $\mathcal{C}$, and each voter has a set $A_v \subset \mathcal{C}$ of…
Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in computational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some amount of money depending on what…
We study the regulation of algorithmic (non-)collusion amongst sellers in dynamic imperfect price competition by auditing their data as introduced by Hartline et al. [2024]. We develop an auditing method that tests whether a seller's…