Related papers: Cutting Cakes Correctly
The famous Ham-Sandwich theorem states that any $d$ point sets in $\mathbb{R}^d$ can be simultaneously bisected by a single hyperplane. The $\alpha$-Ham-Sandwich theorem gives a sufficient condition for the existence of biased cuts, i.e.,…
There is a heterogeneous resource that contains both good parts and bad parts, for example, a cake with some parts burnt, a land-estate with some parts heavily taxed, or a chore with some parts fun to do. The resource has to be divided…
A cake has to be divided fairly among $n$ agents. When all agents have equal entitlements, it is known that such a division can be implemented with $n-1$ cuts. When agents may have different entitlements, the paper shows that at least $2 n…
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway,…
This paper is devoted to present two counterexamples to the theorem from \cite{MK} Maria R., Katherine T. M., Bernardo S. M., Extremal graphs with bounded vertex bipartiteness number, Linear Algebra Appl. 493 (2016) 28-36. Moreover, the…
Alice and Bob want to cut a cake; however, in contrast to the usual problems of fair division, they want to cut it unfairly. More precisely, they want to cut it in ratio $(a:b)$. (We can assume gcd(a,b)=1.) Let f(a,b) be the number of cuts…
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n=2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n > 2 it requires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this…
We consider the setting of repeated fair division between two players, denoted Alice and Bob, with private valuations over a cake. In each round, a new cake arrives, which is identical to the ones in previous rounds. Alice cuts the cake at…
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
Austin's moving knife procedure was originally introduced to find a consensus division of an interval/circular cake between two agents, each of whom believes that they receive exactly half of the cake. We generalise this in two ways: we…
We prove a common generalization of the Ham Sandwich theorem and Alon's Necklace Splitting theorem. Our main results show the existence of fair distributions of $m$ measures in $R^d$ among $r$ thieves using roughly $mr/d$ convex pieces,…
In this work, some counterexamples are given to refute some results reported in the paper by Guo and Li [8] (J Optim Theory Appl 162,(2014), 821-844). We correct the faulty in some of their theorems and we present alternative proofs.…
We study classic cake-cutting problems, but in discrete models rather than using infinite-precision real values, specifically, focusing on their communication complexity. Using general discrete simulations of classical infinite-precision…
This paper has been withdrawn by the author due to an error in Lemma 3, making the (bijective) proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5 invalid (symmetry of k-nonnesting and k-noncrossing set partitions).
In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the…
We initiate the study of fair distribution of delivery tasks among a set of agents wherein delivery jobs are placed along the vertices of a graph. Our goal is to fairly distribute delivery costs (modeled as a submodular function) among a…
We study the proportional chore division problem where a protocol wants to divide an undesirable object, called chore, among $n$ different players. The goal is to find an allocation such that the cost of the chore assigned to each player be…
In the article titled "Branching-Coalescing Particle Systems" published in Probability Theory and Related Fields 131(3), pages 376-414, (2005), Theorem 7 as stated there is incorrect. Indeed, we show by counterexample that the equality that…
In this short note we prove by a counter-example that Theorem 3.2 in the paper "A study on concave optimization via canonical dual function" by J. Zhu, S. Tao, D. Gao is false; moreover, we give a very short proof for Theorem 3.1 in the…