Related papers: Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning

We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…

We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…

We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is…

Machine learning has enabled significant benefits in diverse fields, but, with a few exceptions, has had limited impact on computer architecture. Recent work, however, has explored broader applicability for design, optimization, and…

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an…

Researchers have long proposed using economic approaches to resource allocation in computer systems. However, few of these proposals became operational, let alone commercial. Questions persist about the economic approach regarding its…

Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…

We consider the design of mechanisms that allocate limited resources among self-interested agents using neural networks. Unlike the recent works that leverage machine learning for revenue maximization in auctions, we consider welfare…

A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack of information, and may not be able to perfectly…

We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…

Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…

This paper explores the problem of mediated communication enhanced by money-burning tactics for commitment power. In our model, the sender has state-independent preferences and can design a communication mechanism that both transmits…

Data-management-as-a-service systems are increasingly being used in collaborative settings, where multiple users access common datasets. Cloud providers have the choice to implement various optimizations, such as indexing or materialized…

Numerical optimization of complex systems benefits from the technological development of computing platforms in the last twenty years. Unfortunately, this is still not enough, and a large computational time is still necessary when…

Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…

We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decades, largely due to its practical importance in…

We study the design of optimal allocation mechanisms in an environment where agents and goods arrive stochastically. Agents have private types that determine the principal payoff. Either agents or goods can be held in a queue at a flow cost…