Related papers: Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
This paper develops the theory of mechanism redesign by which an auctioneer can reoptimize an auction based on bid data collected from previous iterations of the auction on bidders from the same market. We give a direct method for…
Reward design is a fundamental problem in reinforcement learning (RL). A misspecified or poorly designed reward can result in low sample efficiency and undesired behaviors. In this paper, we propose the idea of programmatic reward design,…
In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for allocating a divisible commodity (electricity in our example) among consumers. We consider each consumer with an associated personal valuation function of the energy resource during a…
Payment channels allow transactions between participants of the blockchain to be executed securely off-chain, and thus provide a promising solution for the scalability problem of popular blockchains. We study the online network design…
We consider job scheduling settings, with multiple machines, where jobs arrive online and choose a machine selfishly so as to minimize their cost. Our objective is the classic makespan minimization objective, which corresponds to the…
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions…
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…
Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we need to design proper incentives for them to invite each…
We study a cost sharing problem derived from bug bounty programs, where agents gain utility by the amount of time they get to enjoy the cost shared information. Once the information is provided to an agent, it cannot be retracted. The goal,…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
Network design, a cornerstone of mathematical optimization, is about defining the main characteristics of a network satisfying requirements on connectivity, capacity, and level-of-service. It finds applications in logistics and…
Modern recommendation systems rely on the wisdom of the crowd to learn the optimal course of action. This induces an inherent mis-alignment of incentives between the system's objective to learn (explore) and the individual users' objective…
Money is a technology for promoting economic prosperity. Over history money has become increasingly abstract, it used to be hardware, gold coins and the like, now it is mostly software, data structures located in banks. Here I propose the…
We consider a monopolist seller facing a single buyer with additive valuations over n heterogeneous, independent items. It is known that in this important setting optimal mechanisms may require randomization [HR12], use menus of infinite…
We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings.…
In this paper, we design gross product maximization mechanisms which incentivize users to upload high-quality contents on user-generated-content (UGC) websites. We show that, the proportional division mechanism, which is widely used in…
This article provides an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and its application to engineering problems. Our aim is to provide the fundamental principles of the theory of mechanism design for control engineers and theorists…