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When controlling multi-agent systems, the trade-off between performance and scalability is a major challenge. Here, we address this difficulty by using mean field games (MFGs), which is a framework that deduces the macroscopic dynamics…
We show that a simple evolutionary scheme, when applied to the minority game (MG), changes the phase structure of the game. In this scheme each agent evolves individually whenever his wealth reaches the specified bankruptcy level, in…
Here, we examine a mean-field game (MFG) that models the economic growth of a population of non-cooperative rational agents. In this MFG, agents are described by two state variables - the capital and consumer goods they own. Each agent…
The Full Strategy Minority Game (FSMG) is an instance of the Minority Game (MG) which includes a single copy of every potential agent. In this work, we explicitly solve the FSMG thanks to certain symmetries of this game. Furthermore, by…
We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modeling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely ``fundamentalists'' driven by differentiation and ``trend-followers''…
Markov games (MGs) and multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) are studied to model decision making in multi-agent systems. Traditionally, the objective in MG and MARL has been risk-neutral, i.e., agents are assumed to optimize a…
Mean Field Game (MFG) models implicitly assume "rational expectations", meaning that the heterogeneous agents being modeled correctly know all relevant transition probabilities for the complex system they inhabit. When there is common…
The minority game (MG) model introduced recently provides promising insights into the understanding of the evolution of prices, indices and rates in the financial markets. In this paper we perform a time series analysis of the model…
We continue our study of evolution in minority games by examining games in which agents with poorly performing strategies can trade in their strategies for new ones from a different strategy space. In the context of the games discussed in…
We formulate a theory of agent-based models in which agents compete to be in a winning group. The agents may be part of a network or not, and the winning group may be a minority group or not. The novel feature of the present formalism is…
Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this context, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of a MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global…
The general picture of game theoretic modeling dealt with here is characterized by a set of big players, also referred to as principals or major agents, acting on the background of large pools of small players, the impact of the behavior of…
We consider a model that demonstrates the crucial role of inertia and stickiness in multi-agent systems, based on the Minority Game (MG). The inertia of an agent is introduced into the game model by allowing agents to apply hypothesis…
The Minority Game (MG) behaves as a stochastically perturbed deterministic system due to the coin-toss invoked to resolve tied strategies. Averaging over this stochasticity yields a description of the MG's deterministic dynamics via mapping…
A novel framework is presented that combines Mean Field Game (MFG) theory and Hybrid Optimal Control (HOC) theory to obtain a unique $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for a non-cooperative game with switching and stopping times. We consider the…
Financial markets are often driven by latent factors which traders cannot observe. Here, we address an algorithmic trading problem with collections of heterogeneous agents who aim to perform optimal execution or statistical arbitrage, where…
We study a version of the minority game in which one agent is allowed to join the game in a random fashion. It is shown that in the crowded regime, i.e., for small values of the memory size $m$ of the agents in the population, the agent…
In financial markets, agents often mutually influence each other's investment strategies and adjust their strategies to align with others. However, there is limited quantitative study of agents' investment strategies in such scenarios. In…
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…