Related papers: The Complexity of Power-Index Comparison

We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th…

This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…

In this paper we study rankings induced by power indices of players in simple game models of bicameral legislatures. For a bicameral legislature where bills are passed with a simple majority vote in each house we give a condition involving…

The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies and political organizations, where decisions are made by a majority vote…

Shapley values, originating in game theory and increasingly prominent in explainable AI, have been proposed to assess the contribution of facts in query answering over databases, along with other similar power indices such as Banzhaf…

We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…

In classical complexity theory, the two definitions of probabilistically checkable proofs -- the constraint satisfaction and the nonlocal games version -- are computationally equal in power. In the quantum setting, the situation is far less…

We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst…

We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…

We consider some well-known families of two-player, zero-sum, perfect information games that can be viewed as special cases of Shapley's stochastic games. We show that the following tasks are polynomial time equivalent: - Solving simple…

We give new characterizations of core imputations for the following games: * The assignment game. * Concurrent games, i.e., general graph matching games having non-empty core. * The unconstrained bipartite $b$-matching game (edges can be…

We study the computational complexity of fundamental problems over the $p$-adic numbers ${\mathbb Q}_p$ and the $p$-adic integers ${\mathbb Z}_p$. Gu\'epin, Haase, and Worrell proved that checking satisfiability of systems of linear…

Variable selection or importance measurement of input variables to a machine learning model has become the focus of much research. It is no longer enough to have a good model, one also must explain its decisions. This is why there are so…

The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…

Although manipulation and bribery have been extensively studied under weighted voting, there has been almost no work done on election control under weighted voting. This is unfortunate, since weighted voting appears in many important…

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction…

We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…

Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This…

This paper considers the problem of solving infinite two-player games over finite graphs under various classes of progress assumptions motivated by applications in cyber-physical system (CPS) design. Formally, we consider a game graph G, a…