Related papers: Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…
We study the infinite horizon discrete time N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game ($N \geq 2$) with stopping times as strategies (or pure strategies). We prove existence of an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium point for the game by presenting a…
In this report, some properties of the set of Nash equilibria (NEs) of $2 \times 2$ zero-sum games are reviewed. In particular, the cardinality of the set of NEs is given in terms of the entries of the payoff matrix. Moreover, closed-form…
Determining a Nash equilibrium in a $2$-player non-zero sum game is known to be PPAD-hard (Chen and Deng (2006), Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)). The problem, even when restricted to win-lose bimatrix games, remains PPAD-hard (Abbott, Kane and…
Is there an algorithm that takes a game in normal form as input, and outputs a Nash equilibrium? If the payoffs are integers, the answer is yes, and lot of work has been done in its computational complexity. If the payoffs are permitted to…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…
Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a…
Motivated by Generative Adversarial Networks, we study the computation of Nash equilibrium in concave network zero-sum games (NZSGs), a multiplayer generalization of two-player zero-sum games first proposed with linear payoffs. Extending…
Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…
In this paper, we consider a class of $n$-person noncooperative games, where the utility function of every player is given by a homogeneous polynomial defined by the payoff tensor of that player, which is a natural extension of the bimatrix…
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…