Related papers: Sequential mechanism design
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de- sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of…
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty…
The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the…
While the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ensures incentive compatibility for a static one-shot game, it does not appear to be feasible to construct a dominant truth-telling mechanism for agents that are stochastic dynamic systems.…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
Transportation network design often involves multiple stakeholders with diverse priorities. We consider a system with a hierarchical multi-agent structure, featuring self-optimized subnetwork operators at the lower level and a central…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system…
We consider large scale cost allocation problems and consensus seeking problems for multiple agents, in which agents are suggested to collaborate in a distributed algorithm to find a solution. If agents are strategic to minimize their own…
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…
This paper is a brief and informal presentation of cirquent calculus, a novel proof system for resource-conscious logics. As such, it is a refinement of sequent calculus with mechanisms that allow to explicitly account for the possibility…
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget…
The enduring value of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism has been highlighted due to its adoption by Facebook ad auctions. Our research delves into its utility in the collaborative virtual goods production (CVGP) game, which finds…
We consider the problem of online dynamic mechanism design for sequential auctions in unknown environments, where the underlying market and, thus, the bidders' values vary over time as interactions between the seller and the bidders…
Building on the linear programming approach to competitive equilibrium pricing, we develop a general method for constructing iterative auctions that achieve Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcomes. We show how to transform a linear program…
This paper introduces the theoretical framework for combining Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms with the Consensus Planning Protocol (CPP) to enable truthful and efficient collaboration between a retailer and vendors to lower joint…
Counterfactuals have become a popular technique nowadays for interacting with black-box machine learning models and understanding how to change a particular instance to obtain a desired outcome from the model. However, most existing…
Dynamic arrays, also referred to as vectors, are fundamental data structures used in many programs. Modeling their semantics efficiently is crucial when reasoning about such programs. The theory of arrays is widely supported but is not…
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many…
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…