Related papers: Sequential mechanism design
We study the design of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms satisfying participation constraints in the job-matching problem. Each firm can hire multiple workers and each worker can be employed at only one firm. While firm utilities over…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…
Network utility maximization (NUM) is a general framework for designing distributed optimization algorithms for large-scale networks. An economic challenge arises in the presence of strategic agents' private information. Existing studies…
We characterize the communication complexity of truthful mechanisms. Our departure point is the well known taxation principle. The taxation principle asserts that every truthful mechanism can be interpreted as follows: every player is…
It is typically expected that if a mechanism is truthful, then the agents would, indeed, truthfully report their private information. But why would an agent believe that the mechanism is truthful? We wish to design truthful mechanisms,…
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for the cooperative production of virtual products. In our model, a group of producers collaboratively produce a virtual product by contributing costly input resources to a production coalition.…
Cirquent calculus is a new proof-theoretic and semantic framework, whose main distinguishing feature is being based on circuits, as opposed to the more traditional approaches that deal with tree-like objects such as formulas or sequents.…
Without monetary payments, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem proves that under mild requirements all truthful social choice mechanisms must be dictatorships. When payments are allowed, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism implements…
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensional types, standard mechanisms fail to implement efficient…
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…
In the field of Model-Driven Engineering, there exist numerous tools that support various consistency management operations including model transformation, synchronisation and consistency checking. The supported operations, however,…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general…
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an \alpha-approximation algorithm translates into an…
Reading comprehension (RC) is a challenging task that requires synthesis of information across sentences and multiple turns of reasoning. Using a state-of-the-art RC model, we empirically investigate the performance of single-turn and…